~jacks/kings-essays

827d81751c27bbaa1b5665f36812c491149d94dd — jacksarick 10 months ago 3a92815
ardmore draft
M Second Year/CSP/Paper 4/final-essay.pdf => Second Year/CSP/Paper 4/final-essay.pdf +0 -0

M Second Year/CSP/Paper 4/final-essay.tex => Second Year/CSP/Paper 4/final-essay.tex +18 -18
@@ 74,11 74,15 @@ Dr. Sarah Clift\\

%Intro
John Stuart Mill and Carl Schmitt go together like a high-five and a cactus.
This is not to say that the two are diametrically opposed or radically incompatible, Schmitt ruminates on Mill and marks him as the start of the philosophy of the "parallel of theology and jurisprudence" (Schmitt 41).
This is not to say that the two are diametrically opposed or radically incompatible.
Schmitt reads Mill and marks him as the start of the philosophy of the "parallel of theology and jurisprudence" (Schmitt 41).
Both assume that humans are fairly unpredictable, work better in groups that have goals, and need external guidance to regulate behaviour.
It is also assumed that the act of independently making a decision is the highest expression of freedom possible, almost regardless of what the decision is.
There is a mutual feeling that as much as humans are unavoidably political animals, the government shouldn't be overly involved.
Mill makes it clear that "the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place." (Mill, 150) whereas Schmitt puts it as "unlike the normal situation, when the autonomous moment of the decision recedes to a minimum, the norm is destroyed in the exception." (Schmitt 12), which is to say that exceptions disturb the norm.

While not a central issue for either thinker, suicide is an interesting topic that the reveals some intricate side-effects of the way in which definitions are subtly crafted.
One might expect the liberal Mill to permit quiet individual suicide and Schmitt's pragmatism to discourage a loss of labour force, where in reality it is quite the opposite.
Each comes to their own conclusions despite starting at first principles that are not too far apart.
As far as individual freedom is concerned, Mill and Schmitt agree that there are times when the plurality should exert their force to restrict other's freedom for their own sake, though this should ideally happen as little as possible.
One way of beginning to understand how they relate, Schmitt thinks that the conditions under which restrictions are allowed vastly outnumber those in which freedom may go unchecked.


@@ 104,11 108,10 @@ A libertarian state like Mill proposes draws its power from the individual desir
The power of the state is consequentially inversely proportional to the population's capability to get along amicably with itself. 
Schmitt's limitations of governmental power are "that it intervene only when the free individual or associational act proves to be insufficient; it should remain in the background as the \textit{ultima ratio}." (Schmitt 25).
It is from this \textit{ultima ratio}, this ultimate reason, that all laws draw their power, as "it is not the state but law that is supposed to have power." (Schmitt 23).
Moving power from state to law, when the state is defined as the producer the laws (Schmitt 23), limits the power of the state only to the extent that it is subject to it's own laws.
Moving power from state to law, when the state is defined as the producer the laws (Schmitt 23), limits the power of the state only to the extent that it is subject to its own laws.

%Differences in states
Both would seem to grant individuals to make choices for themselves, limited only by the clause that others should also remain sovereign.
In other words, power should only be exerted when necessary.
Both would seem to grant individuals the ability to make choices for themselves, limited only by the clause that others should also remain sovereign.
How is it that with such similar premises, the two thinkers should end up on opposite sides of the issue?
The difference does not lie in their respective notions of sovereignty and freedom, but in their definitions of exceptions.
As Bill Scheuerman says in response to Schmitt, "the liberal model of free debate implied an elected representative's capacity to be guided by the 'best' or most 'truthful' argument rather than power- or interest-based demands," (Scheuerman 136) which is to say that Schmitt's defence against the tyranny of the majority is an abstract one, implemented in the layers of law, not in open discussion as Mill proposed.


@@ 117,36 120,33 @@ Where Mill promotes the maintenance of law through collective criticism, Schmitt
Returning to the importance of exceptions, Mill's exceptional circumstance is obligation to interfere with another's freedom, while Schmitt's exceptional circumstance comes as the affirmation of one's own freedom by the restriction of another's.

%Suicide in Mill
While not a central issue for either thinker, suicide is an interesting topic that the reveals some intricate side-effects of the way in which definitions are subtly crafted.
One might expect the liberal Mill to permit quiet individual suicide and Schmitt's pragmatism to discourage a loss of labour force, where in reality it is quite the opposite.
Suicide can be an act of sovereignty for Schmitt, whereas Mill sees it as shirking of public duty.
Neither ruminate specifically of death, though life has an implicit value for both.
Though Schmitt does not seem particularly concerned with the value of individual lives, especially considering his Nazi affiliations, his definition of power requires a military force based on people, and thus I would argue he sees at least some value in a human life.
Killing oneself is, without exception, a bad thing according to Mill:
Neither ruminate specifically on death, though life has an implicit value for both.\footnote{Though Schmitt does not seem particularly concerned with the value of individual lives, especially considering his Nazi affiliations, his definition of power requires a military force based on people, and thus I would argue he sees at least some value in a human life.}
Killing oneself is, without exception, a bad thing according to Mill's line of reasoning:
\begin{quote}
"... it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his near connexions, and often far beyond them." (Mill 144)

"Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, [...] either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law." (Mill 147)
\end{quote}
These quotes pack quite neatly into a syllogism: If unnecessary damage is to be stopped, and suicide is unnecessary damage, then suicide must be stopped.
This syllogism, like most, does very little to unpack anything beyond the surface of the claim, but it does provide a firmly grounded position from which to understand Mill's chain of reasoning.
This syllogism, like most, does very little to unpack anything beyond the surface of the claim, but it does provide a firmly grounded position from which to understand Mill's thought process.
Although Mill does think that suicide is sufficient grounds to intervene, why exactly that action is immoral is a more tangled issue.
Individual freedoms start and stop with conciousness, so death is a permanent and absolute suspension of any individual freedom.\footnote{While it is illegal to exhume a corpse without proper paperwork, it is not a crime \textit{against the corpse} to do so.}
As such, suicide (actively choosing to die, in contrast to slow suicides like alcoholism that are more of a grey-zone) can be seen a wilful and irreversible forfeiture of one's individual freedoms.
As such, suicide (actively choosing to die, in contrast to slow suicides like alcoholism that are more of a grey-zone) can be seen as a wilful and irreversible forfeiture of one's individual freedoms.
Devoid of freedom, Mill says that "he who lets the world [...] choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation" (Mill 106).
Without individual freedoms and choice, humans are no better than animals.
The act by itself cannot be a liberating act because, as Mill borrows from Von Humboldt (Mill 103), the act is only valuable when held in consort with the actor.
Mill does not believe that suicide is a valid expression of freedom insofar as it invalidates any choices that would follow it.
Suicide is not a freedom that can be restricted because it is not a freedom at all, it is itself a restriction of freedom.
The act by itself cannot be a liberating act because, as Mill borrows from Von Humboldt (Mill 103), the act is only valuable when held in consort with the actor, saying that "it really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it." (Mill 106).
Mill does not believe that suicide is a valid expression of freedom because as it negates any choices that would follow it.
Suicide is not a freedom that can be restricted because it is not a freedom at all, it is itself a restriction of freedom according to Mill.

% Suicide in Schmitt
Schmitt, on the other hand, does not hold the same opinion on suicide, and sees little wrong with suicide.
Similar to Mill's conception that harmful actions must be prevented, Schmitt thinks the state should only intervene when strictly needed, not as a default.
Similar to Mill's axiom of harm prevention, Schmitt thinks the state should only intervene when strictly needed, not as a default.
In his reckoning of theological and political, he says that a "continuous thread runs through the metaphysical, political, and sociological conceptions that postulate the sovereign as a personal unit and primeval creator" (Schmitt 47).
This means that individuals have the freedom to unmake themselves only insofar as they have made themselves.
As long as the suicide does not impinge on the freedoms of the others or the state.
Schmitt states that "the necessity by which the people always will what is right is not identical with the rightness that emanated from the commands of the personal sovereign" (Schmitt 48).
The act of suicide is not contradictory to, and thus not explicitly prohibited by, Mill's definition of freedom because the act of freedom and the freedom itself are not held by the same individual.
As long as the suicide does not impinge on the state's ability to make exceptions, there is nothing the state can legally do to prevent it.
Schmitt says that "the necessity by which the people always will what is right is not identical with the rightness that emanated from the commands of the personal sovereign" (Schmitt 48).
The act of suicide is not contradictory to, and thus not explicitly prohibited by, Schmitt's sovereignty because the act of freedom and the freedom itself are not held by the same individual.
Suicide as an expression of sovereignty cannot be legally intervened with because, as Schmitt says, "sovereignty is the highest, legally independent, un-derived power" (Schmitt 17).
To legally intervene with a suicide would devalue the sovereignty of the actor by basing their sovereignty on an external decision maker, unless, perhaps, an exception were made.
In this way, both the act of suicide and the act of preventing it are maintained as absolutely sovereign.

M Second Year/CSP/Paper 4/notes.md => Second Year/CSP/Paper 4/notes.md +1 -1
@@ 24,7 24,7 @@ The difference is how the state is organized. Schmitt only works with enforceabl

- [x] "Acts of whatever kind, which [unnecessarily] do harm to others, may be [...] controlled by the unfavourable sentiments, and [...] active interference of mankind. The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people." (Mill, 101)

- [ ] "It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it." (Mill 106).
- [x] "It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it." (Mill 106).

- [x] "Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law." (Mill, 147)