~jacks/kings-essays

3a928151e2c310319fd5c27b78efc30db186f5bd — jacksarick 10 months ago 1467f71
done first draft (lol)
M Second Year/CSP/Paper 4/final-essay.pdf => Second Year/CSP/Paper 4/final-essay.pdf +0 -0

M Second Year/CSP/Paper 4/final-essay.tex => Second Year/CSP/Paper 4/final-essay.tex +28 -12
@@ 76,22 76,27 @@ Dr. Sarah Clift\\
John Stuart Mill and Carl Schmitt go together like a high-five and a cactus.
This is not to say that the two are diametrically opposed or radically incompatible, Schmitt ruminates on Mill and marks him as the start of the philosophy of the "parallel of theology and jurisprudence" (Schmitt 41).
Both assume that humans are fairly unpredictable, work better in groups that have goals, and need external guidance to regulate behaviour.
It is also assumed that act of independently making a decision is the highest expression of freedom possible, almost regardless of what the choice is.
Mill makes it clear that "the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place." (Mill, 150) whereas Schmitt puts it as "unlike the normal situation, when the autonomous moment of the decision recedes to a minimum, the norm is destroyed in the exception." (Schmitt 12).
There is a shared feeling that as much as humans are necessarily political animals, the government shouldn't be overly involved.
Each comes to their own conclusions despite starting at first principles that are no too far apart.
It is also assumed that the act of independently making a decision is the highest expression of freedom possible, almost regardless of what the decision is.
There is a mutual feeling that as much as humans are unavoidably political animals, the government shouldn't be overly involved.
Mill makes it clear that "the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place." (Mill, 150) whereas Schmitt puts it as "unlike the normal situation, when the autonomous moment of the decision recedes to a minimum, the norm is destroyed in the exception." (Schmitt 12), which is to say that exceptions disturb the norm.
Each comes to their own conclusions despite starting at first principles that are not too far apart.
As far as individual freedom is concerned, Mill and Schmitt agree that there are times when the plurality should exert their force to restrict other's freedom for their own sake, though this should ideally happen as little as possible.
Schmitt merely thinks that the conditions under which restrictions are allowed vastly outnumber those in which freedom may go unchecked.
One way of beginning to understand how they relate, Schmitt thinks that the conditions under which restrictions are allowed vastly outnumber those in which freedom may go unchecked.

%Schmitt vs Mill on sovereignity
Schmitt's famous line, and the opening line of \textit{Political Theology}, "Sovereign is he who decides the exception" (Schmitt 1), is an actionable aphorism that allows for quantifiable identification of authority in any decision making process.
Even one person on their own can demonstrate sovereignty by consciously choosing to work against the pattern.
Schmitt's famous line, and the opening line of \textit{Political Theology}, "Sovereign is he who decides the exception" (Schmitt 1), is an actionable aphorism that allows for quantifiable identification of authority in any decision making scenario.
Even one person on their own can demonstrate sovereignty by consciously choosing to work against a pattern for suspected gain.
Given a group of people interacting with one another, Schmitt's statement can parse out a power structure based on what kind of decisions are being made whom.
This is the starting point he chooses for the rest of his discussion because it is a standardized definition of power that is necessarily complete, but compatible with context in which he is thinking.
Mill's definition of sovereign fits with Schmitt's at first glance: "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign" (Mill 22).
This is the starting point he chooses for the rest of his discussion because it is a standardized definition of power that is not necessarily complete, but is compatible with context in which he was thinking.
Mill's definition of sovereignty fits with Schmitt's at first glance: "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign" (Mill 22).
Where Schmitt provides a conditional test of sovereignty, Mill offers a static maxim.
In regards to expections, however, Mill asserts that "to make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception." (Mill, 25).
In regards to exceptions, however, Mill asserts that "to make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception." (Mill, 25).
This is to say that individuals are responsible by default for their own evildoing, and those evildoings of others the state deems as exceptional.
To put it another way: Mill thinks that the individuals are culpable for maintain order, whereas Schmitt thinks that all blame ultimately rests on the state.
For Schmitt, this is his basis for a centralized state: 
\begin{quote}
"The hierarchical order that is legally valid in the state rests on the premise that authorizations and competences emanate from the uniform central point to the lowest point. [...] For juristic consideration there are neither real nor fictitious persons, only points of ascription. The state is the terminal point of ascription ..." (Schmitt, 19)
\end{quote}

%The state
How far the power of a state reaches is the basis for its citizen's freedom and sovereignty.


@@ 143,16 148,27 @@ As long as the suicide does not impinge on the freedoms of the others or the sta
Schmitt states that "the necessity by which the people always will what is right is not identical with the rightness that emanated from the commands of the personal sovereign" (Schmitt 48).
The act of suicide is not contradictory to, and thus not explicitly prohibited by, Mill's definition of freedom because the act of freedom and the freedom itself are not held by the same individual.
Suicide as an expression of sovereignty cannot be legally intervened with because, as Schmitt says, "sovereignty is the highest, legally independent, un-derived power" (Schmitt 17).
To legally intervene with a suicide would devalue the sovereignty of the actor intervening by basing sovereignty on an external decision maker, unless, perhaps, an exception were made.
To legally intervene with a suicide would devalue the sovereignty of the actor by basing their sovereignty on an external decision maker, unless, perhaps, an exception were made.
In this way, both the act of suicide and the act of preventing it are maintained as absolutely sovereign.
Mill defines suicide as an exception, and thus temporarily suspends the sovereignty of both actor and bystander because their course of action has been laid out, yet Schmitt leaves the choice  to the bystander and, by extension, the actor.

%Issues
I had previously claimed that Schmitt values human life to some degree, which is true, but I do not, however, make claims as to what degree.
Schmitt's work on Article 48 and its legitimization of dictatorship\footnote{"The apologists downplay the role Schmitt's critique of parliamentarism played in legitimizing a dictatorial alternative to the crisis-ridden Weimar Republic during the early 1930's..."(Scheuerman 135)} should not disqualify his thinking outright, though it should warrant critical inspection.
At the risk of being a little heavy handed, Scheuerman attempts to pluck
At the risk of being a little heavy handed, Scheuerman attempts to pluck the dangerous thread of genocide out from Schmitt's work to fully reveal how terrifying its implications are:
\begin{quote}
"...the democratic tradition's attempt to establish identity supposedly has, in Schmitt's view, an authentically political character. [...] the establishment of political identity may very well imply the necessity of 'exterminating' heterogeneous minorities that fall outside the particular form of homogeneity upon which a given democracy rests. In contrast to liberal parliamentarism, democracy thereby acknowledges the centrality of intense, potentially life-threatening crises." (Scheuerman 140)
\end{quote}
Scheuerman by no means implies that death is necessarily the foundation of any stable democracy, though he does highlight the strictly non-violent nature of liberalism.

% Conclusion
When Schmitt was writing his \textit{Political Theology} in the Weimar Republic, he could not have known the impacts it would have down the line.
What a mind it would have taken to predict the ferocious efficiency with which Article 48 dismantled a government. 
Schmitt equates "the omnipotent lawgiver [to] the omnipotent God," and says that "the exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology." (Schmitt, 36).
Had Schmitt known the masses that would come to worship and be subjected by his laws, he would at least see his prophecies tested if not proven.
Whether or not he'd approve is another story; though his ideologies are undoubtedly severe, death does not bring a smile to any rational face.
Ultimately, neither Schmitt nor Mill think there is are good reasons for suicide, and both would ideally prevent it.
Though the value of one life is not substantial in a massive population, it is the sum of those values that make up the power of a state and enforce the laws that maintain it, and it is those component individuals that the state is built to protect.

%%%%Works cited
\begin{workscited}

M Second Year/CSP/Paper 4/notes.md => Second Year/CSP/Paper 4/notes.md +2 -2
@@ 28,14 28,14 @@ The difference is how the state is organized. Schmitt only works with enforceabl

- [x] "Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law." (Mill, 147)

- [ ] "The strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place." (Mill, 150)
- [x] "The strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place." (Mill, 150)

- [ ] "...it is not difficult to show [...] that to extend the bounds of [...] moral police, until it encroaches on the [...] liberty of the individual, is one of the most universal of all human propensities." (Mill, 152)

##Schmitt
- [x] "Sovereignty is the highest, legally independent, un-derived power." (Schmitt, 17)

- [ ] "The hierarchical order that is legally valid in the state rests on the premise that authorizations and competences emanate from the uniform central point to the lowest point. [...] For juristic consideration there are neither real nor fictitious persons, only points of ascription. The state is the terminal point of ascription ..." (Schmitt, 19)
- [x] "The hierarchical order that is legally valid in the state rests on the premise that authorizations and competences emanate from the uniform central point to the lowest point. [...] For juristic consideration there are neither real nor fictitious persons, only points of ascription. The state is the terminal point of ascription ..." (Schmitt, 19)

- [x] "It is not the state but law that is supposed to have power." (Schmitt, 23)